This is an exploratory analysis.
As tensions between the United States of America (U.S.), China and Taiwan keep rising due to China’s one China policy, the risk of miscalculation also continues to rise. While the U.S., China and Taiwan inherently wish to avoid direct conflict with each other that does not discount the likelihood of indirect conflict arising in the cyber and space domains. Since 2022, China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan via all domains at their disposal. A majority of this pressure was never observed before until after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August of 2022. This was further fueled by the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, which included multiple provisions supporting Taiwan.
As stated in the Annual Threat Assessment (A.T.A) of The U.S. Intelligence Community by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence: “In 2023, Beijing will continue to apply pressure and possibly offer inducements for Taiwan to move toward unification and will react to what it views as increased U.S.–Taiwan engagement. Beijing claims that the United States is using Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine China’s rise, and will continue to take stronger measures to push back against perceived increases in support to Taiwan. Beijing may build on its actions from 2022, which could include more Taiwan Strait centerline crossings or missile overflights of Taiwan.” (U.S. Intelligence Community, 2023)
Chinese Military Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) Violations of Taiwan
A common tactic China uses to apply pressure on Taiwan are violations of the island’s self-imposed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). There were 1,737 aircraft tracked in the ADIZ in 2022, a 79 percent increase from 2021 (972). The average number of monthly and daily aircraft likewise saw a significant increase to 144.75 (from 81), and 6.48 (from 4.05) respectively. The total number of days with violations increased from 240 in 2021 to 268 in 2022 (2022 in ADIZ Violations: China Dials up the Pressure on Taiwan | ChinaPower Project, 2023). The objective of ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) violations extends beyond merely testing and monitoring specific units’ readiness, such as response times, resource availability, and personnel levels in reaction to Chinese aircraft incursions. The ultimate goal is to gradually exhaust these units and place a continuous strain on them. This strategy aims to erode their morale and disrupt resource allocation, potentially setting the stage for a rapid aerial assault if necessary. This tactic can easily be summed up as a gray zone tactic.
Because the U.N. does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, many violations of Taiwan’s sovereignty fall into a gray zone, allowing China to push the boundaries without facing international legal repercussions.
Chinese Amphibious Assault of Taiwan
Another pressure tactic employed by China involves replicating amphibious assault training near Taiwan. While this approach is highly visible, its primary aim is psychological warfare, targeting the Taiwanese populace with a clear and intimidating message. The Chinese military conducts these exercises multiple times a month, employing various scales and often coordinating with the China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These simulations are designed to encircle Taiwan, creating a formidable display that suggests a potential invasion or attack on the island.
Chinese Information, Diplomatic and Economic Warfare
Among other tactics used such as information operations (IO) which would include propaganda messaging to garner support for Taiwan’s KMT party which is more friendly to China and China’s one China policy beliefs. Additionally, China has skillfully employed diplomatic and economic warfare against Taiwan by targeting the few countries that support and trade with Taiwan. In recent years, this strategy has been effective in decreasing the number of countries that officially recognize Taiwan from 14 to 12.
China-Taiwan Invasion Explored & Possible U.S. Responses
In the chance that China does attempt to take Taiwan it is crucial to understand a few timelines. U.S. military leadership believes China aims to have the ability to take Taiwan between 2027-2030 and uniting China and Taiwan by 2049. Furthermore, the U.S. has maintained a foreign policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its involvement in China-Taiwan affairs. The U.S. does not have an explicit red line for defending Taiwan, but it has consistently supported Taiwan through military training, equipment, and, more recently, increased diplomatic and economic engagement. This approach carefully balances relationships to avoid escalation while constraining China and preventing a potential trade war that could disrupt economic relations. However, recent developments and evolving military relations with Taiwan suggest that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity may be gradually shifting.
It is unrealistic to assume that the U.S. would refrain from intervening in the event of a conflict involving Taiwan. Preliminary analysis suggests that China would likely pursue a large-scale amphibious invasion targeting a major port, followed by a rapid advance towards Taipei within hours of landing. This initial invasion would be complemented by a coordinated aerial assault designed to sow confusion and obscure the amphibious operation as well as multiple prolonger other amphibious assaults along multiple axes. The Chinese military would likely target the southwestern beachheads of Taiwan, particularly focusing on the Port of Kaohsiung, due to its favorable terrain and sea levels. Strategically located in Taiwan’s industrial region, the port handles over 5,000 vessels, 18.9 million tonnes of cargo, and 9.8 million TEU annually. As Taiwan’s logistics hub and an Asia-Pacific transshipment center, it plays a crucial role in the economy. Its capacity to support military-grade vessels and equipment, its status as one of the largest cargo ports, and its access to major highways leading directly to Taipei and nearby international airports make it a prime target.
Taiwan’s current capabilities are insufficient to sustain an invasion once an adversarial force has landed, due to limitations in training, budget, and resource allocation. China is acutely aware of these vulnerabilities and would aim to swiftly isolate Taipei from the rest of the island, making a direct and accelerated push to capture the city. It is crucial to recognize that China would need to capture Taipei within approximately two weeks of landing to avoid a significant U.S.-allied response. Should China succeed in taking Taipei before the U.S. and its allies can mount a substantial counteroffensive, it is likely that the U.S. and its allies might accept the loss of Taiwan rather than risk escalating the conflict further. Although further details can be explored, it is crucial to understand that the U.S. will have limited time to detect and intercept such an invasion. While there will be warning signs of an impending invasion, such as large-scale troop movements potentially masked as training exercises, the U.S. will have only a few hours to respond once Chinese forces advance toward Taiwan. In theory, it would take a Chinese amphibious assault force approximately 4-6 hours to cross the Taiwan Strait, traveling at a speed of around 30 knots (34.5 mph). The strait, which separates mainland China from Taiwan, is only 112 miles wide at its narrowest point. This limited response window results from both the short distance and the limited presence of U.S. assets in the immediate region.
The urgency of the situation is underscored by recent tensions and China’s dissatisfaction with international actions. For instance, China’s reactions to recent geopolitical developments demonstrate their commitment to rapid and decisive military operations, further emphasizing the need for swift and effective responses from the U.S. and its allies. The deployment of U.S. assets nearby, along with China’s longstanding protests against the U.S. THAAD deployment in South Korea, highlights these tensions. China’s primary concerns are that the THAAD system’s powerful radars allow the U.S. to detect and monitor deep into Chinese territory and intercept potential threats in the region. This capability significantly increases the U.S. response time in the event of a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Lets explore some possible scenarios of how the U.S. and China could respond.
Scenario 1: China and U.S. Use of Stand-Off-Weapons
One scenario involves the use of long-distance standoff weapons, where both countries might employ a threshold-like approach. If the U.S. receives advanced notice of an impending invasion of Taiwan, Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG-5), based in Yokosuka, Japan, with the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) as its flagship, would likely respond. This response would depend on timely intelligence to mobilize CSG-5, given its considerable distance from Taiwan and travel time. Once in the region, CSG-5 would likely target Chinese assets directly involved in the invasion while avoiding strikes on mainland China to prevent escalation. Initial targets might include Chinese supply, logistics, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets, followed by direct-action targets such as destroyers, fighters, or aircraft carriers. For instance, the U.S. Navy could deploy advanced jamming techniques against Chinese ISR assets or use hypersonic, cruise, and anti-ship ballistic missiles from thousands of miles away, minimizing the risk of retaliation and avoiding direct confrontation. However, this approach carries a significant risk of escalating the conflict. The deployment of THAAD and other advanced weapon systems could play a crucial role in deterring China, but it also has the potential to heighten tensions further.
Scenario 2: China Targets U.S. Assets in Cyber Space
Another likely scenario is China launching cyberattacks against U.S. assets in the region. This could involve degrading services at U.S. military installations in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and the Philippines, potentially targeting critical communication links, internet cables, and other key infrastructure. Such actions, while staying below the threshold of war, would likely provoke a proportional and restrained U.S. response. This scenario is most plausible as it allows China to obscure its movements, create confusion within the U.S., and potentially delay a response. Additionally, it could cause significant damage while avoiding escalation that might lead to loss of life on either side.
Scenario 3: China Targets U.S. Assets in Space Domain
Additionally, China might target U.S. military satellites, particularly those in low Earth orbit related to GPS, with potential escalation to satellites involved in MILSTAR-communications, ISR constellations, and those in high Earth orbit (HEO) critical for nuclear command and control, ballistic missile defense. This scenario would be more escalatory compared to Scenario 2, but it is likely due to the U.S.’s reliance on space-based assets for critical situational awareness. The Chinese military might target U.S. space assets to undermine U.S. capabilities, hoping to deter U.S. intervention and reduce the impact of direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.
Tensions Will Continue to Boil
Ultimately, time is running out for all three nations. From the U.S. perspective, it is clear that China aims to achieve Taiwan unification by the end of this decade, or by no later than 2049. As the U.S. transitions from focusing on counterinsurgency to preparing for conventional warfare across multiple domains, it is crucial for the nation to begin employing deterrent operations. In recent years we have seen some of this taken shape from the U.S. Air Force implementing the Agile Combat Employment to resilient and redundant space networks. The region has seen a rise in freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea, along with large-scale U.S. naval deployments and increased ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) flights. Additionally, there has been a relocation of space-based ISR assets to improve the timely intelligence, tracking, and detection of Chinese military movements. The U.S. has also shown greater commitment to Taiwan by increasing defense budgets, providing enhanced military equipment support, and expanding economic and diplomatic engagement. However, Taiwan currently lacks the resources and training necessary to effectively deter and prepare for a potential Chinese invasion. The U.S. has recommended that Taiwan enhance its coastal defenses and deploy modular port barriers. These measures aim to make large ports less attractive targets for the Chinese military, forcing China to establish makeshift ports during an invasion. In conclusion, it is unlikely that the U.S. and China will engage in direct conflict on each other’s mainland. Instead, it is more probable that skirmishes will occur near Taiwan, with escalated conflicts particularly in the cyber and space domains. Until 2022, the conflict has been manageable by all parties; however, due to recent events and the anticipated gradual shift in U.S. strategy, tensions are expected to continue rising. The U.S. is likely to maintain a deterrent and defensive posture, waiting for China to make the first move before initiating any response.
Universal Intelligence 
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